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How do domestic attributes affect international 




Although there is evidence that CO2-efficiency enhancing innovations in one country 
diffuse into other countries to contribute to the goals of climate change mitigation, 
very little is known about the conditions under which such international spillovers are 
most likely to take place. Our contribution in the present article seeks to address this 
gap by examining whether the strength of cross-border CO2-efficiency 
interdependence working through import ties and inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) stocks is greater in (a) countries with lower existing levels of domestic CO2-
efficiency and (b) countries with greater social capabilities in terms of a better 
educated workforce and a less risky institutional environment for investment. We find 
that less CO2-efficient countries and countries with a more investment-friendly 
institutional environment experience stronger FDI-weighted CO2-efficiency 
spillovers, whereas a higher level of human capital increases domestic receptivity to 
import-weighted international spillovers. 
 






Within debates surrounding the dynamics of anthropogenic emissions, growing 
attention has been paid to the existence of international spillovers (Bosetti et al. 2009; 
Golombek and Hoel 2005; IPCC 2007). These are hypothesised to occur when 
greenhouse gas (GHG) efficiency-enhancing technologies and performances in one 
economy diffuse (“spillover”) into another economy (Grubb et al. 2002; Sijm et al. 
2004; Stern 2007). Recent work has lent support to the existence of international 
spillovers, finding that a higher level of import-weighted carbon dioxide (CO2)-
efficiency in other countries is positively correlated with domestic CO2-efficiency, 
indicative of the existence of cross-national spatial interdependencies in emissions 
(Perkins and Neumayer 2008, 2009).  
 Missing from this work, however, has been any attempt to investigate the 
influence of domestic attributes over international spillovers of CO2-efficiency. 
Instead, attention has focused solely on variations in average levels of connectivity-
weighted CO2-efficiency in other countries, on the assumption that domestic attributes 
do not exert a conditioning influence. Yet there are compelling reasons to suspect that 
characteristics of the focal country might well influence the degree of cross-national 
spatial interdependence.  
Our goal in the present article is to explore this hitherto neglected issue. 
Specifically, we examine whether the strength of spatial interdependence working 
through import ties and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks is greater in (a) 
countries with lower existing levels of domestic CO2-efficiency and (b) countries with 
6 
greater social capabilities, defined here in terms of human capital and the institutional 
environment for investment. Similar attributes have been invoked in related 
conceptual and empirical research which has investigated income catch-up, 
convergence and economic productivity spillovers (Abramovitz 1986; Coe et al. 2008; 
Fagerberg 1994; Keefer and Knack 1997). They have also been discussed in work 
which has considered the conditions under which technology transfer and spillovers 
are most likely to contribute to the goals of climate mitigation (Ang 2009; De Cian 
2007; IPCC, 2000, 2007). However, we are unaware of any work which has examined 
empirically the influence of existing emissions-efficiency or social capabilities in 
mediating the strength of international spillovers in the case of CO2-efficiency, or 
indeed similar measures of environmental performance. 
Consistent with theoretical predications, our work shows that domestic factors 
mediate cross-national spillovers, although the influence of individual attributes varies 
between import and FDI channels. Hence, we find that less CO2-efficient countries 
and countries with a more business-friendly institutional environment experience 
stronger inward FDI-weighted spillovers, whereas a better educated workforce 
increases domestic receptivity to import-weighted international spillovers. Thus, 
while different attributes matter, country characteristics would appear to 
systematically shape the degree to which higher levels of CO2-efficiency abroad 
spillover domestically.  
 
2. International spillovers  
 
7 
The basic idea underlying international spillovers is that innovations, behaviours and 
performances in one country spillover across national borders by altering the optimal 
choices for actors in other countries (Pitlik 2007). Within the literature on climate 
mitigation, particular significance has been ascribed to technology spillovers, whereby 
efficiency-enhancing technological efforts diffuse cross-nationally, whether in 
embodied (i.e. physical plant and equipment) or disembodied (i.e. know-how, know-
why, etc.) form (IPCC 2007; Nagashima and Dellink 2008). Their assumed 
importance is two-fold. First, technology plays a central role in improving domestic 
CO2-efficiency, and can therefore potentially counteract the emissions-enhancing 
effects of scale (Peters et al. 2007; Worrell et al. 2009). Second, a large share of the 
world’s innovative efforts, including research and development (R&D) instrumental 
in improving CO2-efficiency, takes place in a handful of developed economies 
(OECD 2008). International technology spillovers allow other countries – including 
developing ones – to take advantage of these innovative efforts and, moreover, 
potentially below the inventor’s original costs (Rao et al. 2006; Stern 2007).  
 An important corollary of international spillovers is that efficiency-enhancing 
technological change in one country may diffuse across national borders to raise 
domestic CO2-efficiency in other countries. On the supply-side, such spillovers may 
arise from the deliberate transfer of embodied or disembodied technology, e.g. via the 
purchase of equipment from foreign vendors, licensing agreements, internal transfers 
of new technology from a transnational corporation’s (TNC’s) parent to its overseas 
subsidiary. Additionally, technology transfer may take place indirectly as a by-
product of these market transactions, in the form of knowledge spillovers (Saggi 
2002). These positive externalities arise from the quasi public good characteristics of 
technological knowledge and mean that firms can appropriate the benefits of foreign 
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technological innovation without fully compensating the original inventor (Popp 
2006). 
On the demand-side, CO2-efficiency enhancing spillovers may be the product 
of competitive pressures, transmitted via cross-border price and/or quality effects (De 
Cian 2007; Grubb et al. 2002). As an example, the uptake of more advanced, energy-
efficient capital equipment (which is also more CO2-efficient) may help firms based 
in one country to reduce their production costs, creating price-based pressures for 
foreign firms which compete in the same product markets to adopt similar efficiency-
enhancing technologies (Luken and Van Rompaey 2008; Perkins 2007). Another 
aspect of demand-side spillovers stems from spatial interdependence in policy 
choices. Whether for competitive, reputational or technical reasons, public or private 
policies adopted by actors in one territory may be “copied” by counterparts in other 
territories (Busch et al. 2005). Again, this may indirectly create demand for 
technologies which enhance domestic CO2-efficiency, as in the case of promotional 
policies supporting the uptake of new renewables in electricity generation (OECD 
2008).1 
Regardless of the specific mechanism, international spillovers logically 
depend on transnational linkages connecting geographically dispersed countries, 
which serve as conduits for embodied and disembodied knowledge, policy 
innovations, and competitive pressures. Most widely discussed in the context of 
international climate spillovers are cross-border economic ties created respectively by 
trade and FDI (De Cian 2007; Mielnik and Goldemberg 2002; Perkins and Neumayer 
                                                 
1
 As hypothesised in the literature, policy-driven price effects (e.g. from carbon taxes) in 
higher-regulating countries may give rise to “negative” international spillovers, as carbon-
intensive industrial production shifts to lower-regulating countries (Sijm et al., 2004 ). We do 
not rule out the possibility of so-called “carbon leakage”. Yet it is not the central focus of our 
study which is concerned with relative (i.e. CO2-efficiency) rather than absolute measures (i.e. 
aggregate CO2) of GHG emissions and, in any case, we partly control for dynamic shifts in 
economic structure in our research design. 
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2008; Peterson 2008). Picking-up on this work, we focus on international spillovers in 
CO2-efficiency through these two linkages in the present study, and specifically on 
imports of machinery and manufactured goods and inward FDI stock. 
 
3. The moderating effects of the domestic context 
 
One way in which scholars have sought to examine the existence of international 
spillovers is through the use of spatial lags (Prakash and Potoski 2007). Also known 
as spatial autoregressive models, spatial lags allow quantitative researchers to 
investigate whether the connectivity-weighted value of an environmental attribute in 
other countries is correlated with the same domestic attribute in a focal economy, and 
therefore the extent to which innovations, behaviours and performances diffuse across 
borders via transnational linkages. Using this spatial econometric approach, Perkins 
and Neumayer (2008, 2009) find evidence for spillovers. They show that higher levels 
of machinery and manufactured goods import-weighted CO2-efficiency in other 
economies is associated with higher levels of domestic CO2-efficiency. Yet the 
authors fail to find evidence that inward FDI stock-weighted foreign CO2-efficiency 
influences domestic efficiency. 
The present article builds on this work, but takes the analysis one crucial step 
further. In particular, we analyse whether domestic attributes influence the degree of 
connectivity-weighted spatial CO2-efficiency interdependence. That is, we examine 
whether characteristics of the focal country amplify or attenuate the influence of other 
countries’ CO2-efficiency on domestic efficiency, where other countries are defined as 
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(i) exporters of machinery and manufactured goods to the focal country and (ii) 
sources of inward FDI to the focal economy.  
Theoretical inspiration for our decision to investigate the influence of 
domestic attributes primarily comes from related work concerned with economic 
productivity spillovers, income convergence and catch-up. This stream of scholarship 
has invoked two sets of factors which might plausibly influence the strength of spatial 
interdependence: (a) relative backwardness, in the sense of countries’ comparative 
inefficiency; and (b) social capabilities, in terms of countries’ capacity to acquire and 
absorb new technology (Abramovitz 1986; Fagerberg 1994). Drawing from this work, 
we hypothesise that similar factors could well influence the degree to which higher 
levels of CO2-efficiency in other countries to which a particular economy is linked via 
transnational economic ties spillover to raise domestic CO2-efficiency. 
 
3.1 Relative backwardness (the “inefficiency” thesis) 
 
The idea that relative inefficiency or backwardness2 might be an advantage in 
appropriating new, more efficient technology has its roots in the work of 
Gerschenkron (1962) who explored the conditions under which latecomer economies 
develop. Similar ideas underpin the so-called catch-up thesis – also known as the 
convergence hypothesis – which maintains that domestic rates of economic 
productivity growth are positively related to the relative backwardness of economies 
(Abramovitz 1986). According to technology transfer variants of these theories, catch-
up takes place because less efficient economies have a larger global stock of un-
                                                 
2
 We do not seek to use the term backwardness in a pejorative sense, but, rather, to maintain 
consistency with relevant theoretical literature. 
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tapped knowledge from which to draw, meaning that they can make more rapid leaps 
in productivity (Findlay 1978). Moreover, such countries can take advantage of 
learning economies and knowledge externalities arising from technological efforts in 
frontrunner economies, which reduce the costs of new technologies, improve their 
performance and increase adoption returns (Grubb 2004; Perkins and Neumayer 2005; 
Rao et al. 2006). 
The same logic can be extended to CO2-efficiency. Less efficient countries are 
more likely to make significant gains in domestic carbon-efficiency by incorporating 
previously unexploited or under-exploited CO2-efficient technologies innovated in 
high-efficiency economies (Ang 2009). Moreover, the economic savings from rapidly 
adopting these technologies should be greater for less environment-efficient 
economies, in that imitation is less costly than innovation. Competitive price and/or 
quality effects emanating from producers in high-efficiency economies mean that 
competitors in CO2-inefficient countries – whose implied technological backwardness 
might well render them uncompetitive – should also face strong economic incentives 
to catch-up technologically with more pollution-efficient countries3 (Grubb et al. 
2002). 
Accepting these arguments, it follows that transnational economic linkages 
with more CO2-efficient countries should spillover more strongly into higher levels of 
domestic efficiency in focal countries with lower levels of existing CO2-efficiency.  
 
3.2 Social capabilities (the “capabilities” thesis)  
 
                                                 
3
 Note, there may be circumstances where competition-driven technological upgrading 
reduces CO2-efficiency, although we believe that such instances will be outweighed by those 
which increase efficiency. 
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Although intuitively appealing, the thesis that less efficient countries should benefit 
more in terms of productivity growth from the global stock of technological 
knowledge has been criticised by scholars who argue that it does not tell the full story. 
In particular, as well as domestic levels of inefficiency, productivity gains depend on 
“social capabilities” (Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973), generally understood as the suite 
of capacities required to adopt and absorb foreign technology in ways which are 
appropriate to local needs (Bell and Pavitt 1993). 
Two main categories of social capability have been invoked in the economics 
literature. The first is human capital. Countries with educated workforces are assumed 
to be better-placed to effectively utilize currently-available foreign technology to 
improve domestic productivity. Hence, not only should they find it cheaper and easier 
to adopt, optimise and improve physical equipment acquired from abroad, but also 
exploit productivity enhancing knowledge externalities embedded in transferred 
technology (Facundo et al. 2009; Lall 1992). Human capital, in turn, better-allows 
domestic firms to respond to competitive pressures from more productive foreign 
competitors by upgrading their technologies.  
Another oft-discussed aspect of social capability is the institutional 
environment. Within this broad category, a wide range of domestic attributes have 
been mentioned, including corruption, rule of law, security of property rights, and the 
ease of doing business (Coe et al. 2008; Keefer and Knack 1997). Yet a common 
feature of arguments which emphasise institutional aspects is the assumption that the 
institutional environment affects business risk. In doing so, it influences the 
propensity of foreign business actors to transfer new technologies, and the willingness 
of potential recipients to make domestic investments required to acquire new 
technological hardware and absorb associated knowledge.  
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An important corollary is that countries without appropriate capabilities will 
fail to fully capture (potential) productivity gains derived from technological efforts 
made in more productive countries. In fact, similar points have been made in work 
concerned with the conditions for the successful transfer of GHG-efficient 
technologies, which has highlighted the importance of a suitable “enabling 
environment” (IPCC 2000; Rock et al. 2009; UNDP 2007; UNFCCC n.d.). Amongst 
the attributes mentioned in this regard is the existence of domestic technological 
capabilities (skills, etc.) required to acquire, absorb and innovate new climate 
mitigation technologies, as well as domestic institutions which mitigate commercial 
risks for investors and technology transfer agents. We therefore hypothesize that 
transnational economic ties with more CO2-efficient economies should spillover more 
strongly into higher levels of domestic CO2-efficiency in countries (a) with a better 
educated workforce and (b) where the institutional environment for business 
investment is less risky.  
 
4. Previous evidence 
 
We are aware of no existing quantitative research which has examined the influence 
of the above mediating domestic attributes – i.e. domestic efficiency and social 
capabilities – on intCO2-efficiency spillovers. Yet evidence from a wider set of 
environmental and non-environmental studies provides a degree of support for both 
the inefficiency and capabilities thesis. 
Several studies lend weight to the idea that less efficient countries gain more 
(i.e. in terms of higher domestic efficiency) from international spillovers than their 
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more efficient counterparts. Hence there is some evidence that foreign knowledge 
spillovers have a greater positive impact on domestic economic productivity growth 
where countries are currently relatively less productive (Castellani and Zanfei 2003; 
Griffith et al. 2004; Peri and Urban 2006; Sjöholm 1999; Xu and Wang 2000). 
However, other studies contradict these results, finding that less productive firms 
(Kokko, Tansini et al. 1996; Girma, Greenaway et al. 2001; Dimelis 2005) and/or 
poorer countries (Crespo, Martín et al. 2004) benefit less from international 
technology spillovers. Still others find a U-shaped relationship between foreign 
productivity spillovers, on the one hand, and relative efficiency and wealth, on the 
other (Meyer and Sinani 2009).  
Turning to work which has examined environment-efficiency, Perkins and 
Neumayer (2008) find cross-national convergence at the global level in CO2-
efficiency, albeit only at moderate rates. These findings are, in principle, consistent 
with the story of less efficient countries improving their domestic CO2-efficiency 
more rapidly by incorporating previously unexploited or under-exploited technologies 
from abroad.  
 Another stream of work presents evidence that, directly or indirectly, supports 
the importance of social capabilities. Multiple studies have shown that rates of 
productivity growth and/or catch-up associated with international technology 
spillovers are positively correlated with levels of human capital (Coe et al. 2008; 
Crespo et al. 2004; Engelbrecht 1997; Falvey et al. 2007; Frantzen 2000; Wang 2007; 
Xu and Chiang 2005). These findings mirror research which demonstrates that more 
modern, advanced technologies diffuse faster in better-educated countries (Kiiski and 
Pohjola 2002; Perkins and Neumayer 2005). 
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Studies have also found that rates of economic growth (Mauro 1995), 
productivity growth (Coe et al. 2008), and income convergence (Keefer and Knack 
1997) derived from international technology spillovers are influenced by the domestic 
institutional environment. Although the nature and scope of relevant institutional 
aspects have been interpreted differently by different authors, amongst the variables 
identified in the literature as statistically significant correlates have been the “ease of 
doing business”,” “rule of law”, “contract enforceability” and “executive constraints” 
(Coe et al. 2008; Keefer and Knack 1997).  
 
5. Research design 
5.1 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable for our estimations is the log of a country’s CO2-efficiency, 
i.e. GDP divided by CO2 emissions. GDP at exchange rates is known to underestimate 
effective purchasing power in lower income countries and we therefore use GDP on a 
purchasing power parity (PPP) basis. Data for both CO2 emissions and GDP are taken 
from IEA (2008). The unit of analysis is the country year. Our global sample 
comprises 77 (developed and developing) countries over the period 1984-2005, with 
coverage being limited only by the availability of data. The list of countries included 
in the study is shown in the appendix. 
 
5.2 Explanatory variables 
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We focus on international spillovers through two types of transnational economic 
linkage. The first is created by imports of machinery and manufactured goods. 
Imports of machinery (e.g. steel plant) and manufactures (e.g. automobiles) from 
CO2-efficient economies should plausibly embody higher levels of energy/carbon-
efficiency than from CO2-inefficient ones. The adoption of this technology in the 
importing economy might therefore be expected to raise domestic CO2-efficiency 
(Perkins 2007; Rock et al. 2009). More advanced technical knowledge embedded in 
CO2-efficient technology also increases the possibilities for knowledge spillovers 
which raise CO2-efficiency, as domestic firms learn from imported technology, 
diffusing the efficiency-enhancing benefits of imports beyond the transferred physical 
artefacts (De Cian 2007). Another way in which imports of machinery and 
manufactured goods from more CO2-efficient economies might diffuse superior levels 
of CO2-efficiency is through competitive effects. Especially for energy-intensive 
production and consumption technologies, where levels of energy consumption may 
be a factor in consumer choice, imports of superior, efficient technology may 
stimulate domestic firms to improve the energy-efficiency of their own process or 
product technologies.   
 Another reason to focus on imports of machinery and manufactured goods in 
CO2-efficiency enhancing technology spillovers is that their influence has been 
demonstrated in previous work. Most relevant is Perkins and Neumayer (2008, 2009) 
who find that levels of CO2-efficiency in other countries weighted by machinery and 
manufactured goods imports are positively correlated with domestic levels of CO2-
efficiency. However, similar findings have been made by scholars who have 
investigated productivity spillovers, with imports of capital goods from more 
productive economies giving rise to higher levels of domestic productivity (Coe and 
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Helpman 1995; Eaton and Kortum 1996; Falvey et al. 2004). In order to construct our 
import-weighted spatial lag variable, we use for the weighting matrix data on 
machinery and manufactured goods imports of country i from countries k, with data 
from UN (2009).  
 A second linkage examined in the present study is inward FDI although, 
unlike our import linkage variable, lack of disaggregated investment data with 
widespread geographic coverage means that we are unable to restrict our analysis to 
sectors most likely to impact domestic CO2-efficiency. Again, there are compelling 
reasons to expect FDI from more CO2-efficient countries to play a leading role in 
diffusing superior levels of CO2-efficiency. Most importantly, TNCs innovate, own, 
operate and vend many of the world’s advanced technologies, including ones with 
superior CO2-efficiency (UNCTAD 2007). Indeed, these ownership-based advantages 
allow transnationals to compete with domestic rivals, who have advantages of their 
own. Through their investments in host economies, TNCs from more CO2-efficient 
economies may transfer advanced, environment-efficient technologies and 
organizational practices directly, incorporating them in process equipment, or 
engineering them into their products (Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004; Mielnik and 
Goldemberg 2002; OECD 1997; Prakash and Potoski 2007). 
Indirectly, the presence of TNCs is known to give rise to knowledge 
spillovers, as domestic firms learn from knowledge embedded in the technologies and 
practices operated by their foreign rivals, e.g. by observing, reverse engineering, 
labour turnover, etc (Cole et al. 2008; Facundo et al. 2009). The involvement of TNCs 
from more CO2-efficient countries may additionally give rise to increased price and/or 
quality competition which incentivise firms to invest in more modern, efficient 
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technologies and, moreover, raise average levels of efficiency by forcing inefficient 
firms out of business (Ang 2009; Saggi 2002). 
Empirical support for the influence of FDI is more mixed. For a sample of 20 
developing countries, Mielnik and Goldemberg (2002) find that inward FDI is 
negatively correlated with energy-intensity, albeit using a rudimentary bivariate 
correlation without controls. Using a larger sample of developed and developing 
countries, and a multivariate estimation model, Perkins and Neumayer (2008) find 
that higher levels of aggregate inward FDI stock is associated with higher domestic 
CO2-efficiency. Yet, deploying a more sophisticated spatial lag specification, Perkins 
and Neumayer (2009) demonstrate that levels of inward FDI stock-weighted CO2-
efficiency in other countries have no statistically significant influence on domestic 
CO2-efficiency in developing countries. Hübler and Keller (2008) also fail to find any 
consistent evidence that FDI flows into developing countries reduce domestic energy-
intensity. Similarly ambiguous results for FDI can be found in the productivity 
spillovers literature (Hejazi and Safarian 1999; Lai et al. 2006; Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie and Lichtenberg 2001). Our FDI-weighted spatial lag measure is constructed 
using UNCTAD (2008) data on the stock of inward foreign direct investment in 
country i originating from countries k as the connectivity variable. 
 We also include variables which seek to capture the existing level of domestic 
efficiency and social capabilities. In our first regression model, we include these as 
separate explanatory variables, with a view to analysing whether they have an 
independent influence on domestic CO2-efficiency. Yet our principal concern is 
whether domestic attributes have a “conditioning” influence on the degree of 
international spillovers. In our main estimations, we therefore use an interactive 
model specification, whereby variables measuring existing levels of efficiency and 
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aspects of social capabilities are interacted with the import- and inward FDI-weighted 
spatial lags. 
Levels of domestic efficiency are measured by the log of a country’s CO2-
efficiency lagged by one period, i.e. by the temporally lagged dependent variable.4 As 
per models of cross-national catch-up, we expect less CO2-efficient countries to 
improve their domestic CO2-efficiency faster, and for the import- and inward FDI-
weighted CO2-efficiency spillovers to be stronger in these countries. 
In order to measure social capability, we use two variables, each intended to 
capture a key enabling attribute identified in the literature. The first is human capital. 
As an attribute in its own right, we expect countries with educated workforces to have 
higher domestic CO2-efficiency, since they should be better-placed to innovate, adopt 
and improve more CO2-efficient technologies. Similarly, human capital is likely to 
have an important conditioning influence on international spillovers, with educated 
workforces possessing greater abilities to effectively utilise and optimise transferred 
equipment to suit local conditions, assimilate foreign technological knowledge 
derived from imports and FDI, as well as respond to associated competitive pressures 
which stimulate efficiency-enhancing technological catch-up. In order to capture 
human capital, we use data from Cohen and Soto (2007) on the secondary school 
completion ratio of the population aged 25 and above, a measure which has been 
widely-used in past studies (e.g. Wang 2007). 
Another category of social capability explored in the present study is the 
institutional environment for investment. From a theoretical perspective, by 
influencing the degree of business risk, the institutional environment should affect the 
                                                 
4
 Note that while this variable seemingly measures backwardness rather than relative backwardness, we 
also include year-specific fixed effects, which means that for each country the emissions-efficiency 
variable measures deviations from the period-average of emissions-effiency and, thus, in effect 
measures relative backwardness. 
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extent to which firms might be willing to invest in capital-intensive, carbon-efficient 
plant and equipment. Additionally, the institutional environment might be expected to 
shape firms’ willingness to make learning investments, and thus their ability to more 
fully appropriate foreign knowledge spillovers. 
Two criteria were used to select our measure of the institutional environment, 
namely: (i) that it should capture institutional attributes which directly influence 
firms’ decisions to make efficiency-enhancing investments and, moreover, in ways 
that affect the degree of spillover from the spatial lag variables; and (ii) the 
constituent measure should exhibit variability within countries over time so as to 
reduce the possibility of collinearity with the country fixed effects used in our study. 
Accordingly, we decided against using a number of institutional measures such as 
bureaucratic quality or rule of law, whose influence over firms’ investment decisions 
is only indirect and which have little temporal variability. Instead, we make use of a 
measure which fulfils both of the above criteria, called “investment profile” (PRS 
2009). Published in the International Country Risk Guide, investment profile is a 
composite of three factors: contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation and 
payment delays. The measure runs from 0-12, with 0 representing the highest amount 
of risk, and 12 the lowest, i.e. the most investor-friendly level. 
Admittedly, this variable is more likely to be relevant for our FDI-weighted 
spatial lag, relating directly to the risks faced by foreign investors. Unfortunately, we 
are unaware of any similar measure which captures the equivalent business risk faced 
by domestic investors, and especially firms who might acquire plant and equipment 
from abroad or otherwise exploit knowledge embedded in imports. From a conceptual 
perspective, however, we believe that the investment profile variable might well also 
capture risk which affects spillovers from imports of machinery and manufactured 
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goods. Hence, an institutional environment which poses greater business risk to 
foreign investors is also one which is likely to reduce the willingness of domestic 
actors to purchase capital-intensive technologies from abroad, as well as to make the 
sorts of investments required to make productive use of imported foreign technologies 
and associated knowledge.  
 
5.3 Control variables 
 
We include the share of industry in value added to control for the fact that more 
industry-intensive economies should, all other things equal, be more CO2-intensive. 
Industry directly and indirectly accounts for approximately 37% of GHG emissions 
(Worrell et al. 2009), suggesting that a failure to take account of cross-country 
differences in industry-intensity might well bias the estimates. 
 We also include GDP per capita to control for income-dependent demand- and 
supply-side effects which might plausibly influence domestic CO2-efficiency. 
Regarding the former, countries with wealthier populations have tended to 
demonstrate greater concern for climate change, creating political and market demand 
for measures to reduce CO2 emissions. At a multilateral level, richer countries have 
also faced greater normative obligations to address domestic emissions, 
institutionalised into binding emission reduction commitments for Annex I (i.e. 
developed) countries under the Kyoto Protocol. Although the compliance period 
(2008-2012) for these commitments is beyond the end of our study period, signatory 
governments have nevertheless been active in initiating actions to address domestic 
GHG emissions long before this time. On the supply-side, richer countries should 
command greater financial capabilities required to innovate, commercialise and 
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implement CO2-efficient technologies, which are often more capital-intensive (IPCC 
2007; Worrell et al. 2009). Table 1 provides summary descriptive statistical 
information for all variables included in the study. 
 
5.4 Model and estimator 
  
We estimate variants of the following model (i stands for country, t for time): 
 
(1) 1 1 2 3 4 5ln ln ln %it i it it it it ity y GDPpc indust edu invprofα β β β β β−= + + + + +  
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− − − −
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8 1 1 1 9 1 1 1ln ln ln ln
imp FDI
ikt kt it ikt kt it
k k
w y y w y yβ β
− − − − − −
+ ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑  
10 1 1 11 1 1ln ln
imp FDI
ikt kt it ikt kt it
k k
w y edu w y eduβ β
− − − −
+ ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑  
12 1 1 13 1 1ln ln
imp FDI
ikt kt it ikt kt it
k k
w y invprof w y invprofβ β
− − − −
+ ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑  
t ituδ+ +  
where yit is the dependent variable, iα  represent country-specific fixed effects, 1ln ity −  
is the temporally lagged dependent variable, itGDPpc  is a country’s per capita 
income, % itindust  its industrial share of GDP, itedu  is the level of a country’s human 
capital, itinvprof  is a country’s investment profile, 1 1lnimpikt kt
k
w y






− −∑  represent the two spatial lag variables described in more detail 
below, tδ  represent year-specific fixed effects and itu  is the error term. We find 
evidence for the “inefficiency” hypothesis if 8β  and/or 9β  are statistically 
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− −∑ , respectively, becomes smaller the 
higher the country’s existing efficiency, or greater the lower a country’s existing CO2-
efficiency. We find evidence for the “capabilities” hypothesis if 10β  and/or 11β  and 
12β  and/or 13β  are statistically significantly positive since then the degree of spillover 
from the spatial lag variables becomes stronger the higher the domestic level of 
human capital and the less risky the institutional environment for investment. 
The country-specific fixed effects account for unobserved country differences 
influencing domestic pollution-efficiency which do not vary, or vary very little over 
time, and which might be correlated with our explanatory variables. The year-specific 
fixed effects capture time-specific global trends influencing emissions efficiency. 
Country- and time-specific fixed effects are also necessary to prevent spurious 
regression results for the spatial lag variables as they account for unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity and common shocks and common trends (Plümper and Neumayer 
2009). 
We estimate equation (1) with Arellano and Bond’s (1991) dynamic 
generalized method of moments (GMM) instrumental variables estimator with robust 
standard errors. This estimator is necessary because of the simultaneous inclusion of 
the temporally lagged dependent variable and country-specific fixed effects, which 
would cause Nickell (1981) bias in a simple fixed effects estimation. Arellano and 
Bond’s estimator has the additional advantage that the spatial lag variables can be 
explicitly specified as endogenous, i.e. their past and contemporaneous values are 
allowed to be correlated with the error terms. The estimator works by first-
differencing equation (1), which eliminates the country-specific fixed effects, and by 
using past levels of the lagged dependent variable and the endogenous variables 
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lagged by two or more periods as respective instruments. First-order autocorrelation 
in the original data is unproblematic, but the estimator depends on the assumption of 
no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced idiosyncratic errors. This can 
be tested and the test results fail to reject this assumption. Our T is relatively large, 
which gives a very large number of potential instruments. Using too many instruments 
can bias the estimation results (Roodman 2007). We have therefore restricted the use of 




Table 2 presents the estimation results. We start off with our estimations where the 
spatial lag and explanatory variables are entered on their own, i.e. without any 
interaction effects (column 1). As anticipated, we find evidence for conditional 
convergence in that the coefficient of the temporally lagged dependent variable minus 
one is statistically significantly negative throughout,5 suggesting that countries with 
lower existing domestic levels of efficiency improve their CO2-efficiency faster. This 
finding is consistent with the catch-up story and, moreover, with Perkins and 
Neumayer (2008) who find evidence for moderate rates of cross-national convergence 
in levels of CO2-efficiency over time. Conversely, we find that our education measure 
has no statistically significant influence by itself, and the investment profile measure 
has an unexpected negative impact on domestic CO2-efficiency. Regarding the control 
variables, as anticipated we find that richer countries have higher domestic CO2-
                                                 
5
 This cannot be directly observed from tables 1 and 2, but follows from the confidence 
intervals of the estimated coefficients.  
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efficiency, whereas countries with a higher share of industry in value added have 
lower efficiency. 
Moving to our non-interacted spatial lag variables, we find that higher 
machinery and manufactured goods import-weighted CO2-efficiency in other 
countries is positively and statistically significantly correlated with higher domestic 
CO2-efficiency, a result which mirrors the one reported in Perkins and Neumayer 
(2008, 2009). However, we find no similar relationship for FDI, with the estimated 
coefficient of the inward investment-weighted spatial lag variable statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Again, this result is similar to the findings of Perkins and 
Neumayer (2009), although their sample is restricted to developing countries only. 
The estimated degree of international spillover through imports is moderately strong. 
A one percent increase in import-weighted foreign CO2-efficiency is associated with 
approximately 0.3% rise in domestic CO2-efficiency in the short-run and an 
approximately 0.68% rise in the long-run. 
Could it be that the insignificant result for the spatial lag variable weighted by 
inward FDI stock arises because there are important conditioning effects not captured 
by the model specification in column 1? In column 2, we interact the spatial lag 
variables with domestic efficiency lagged by one period. The respective coefficients 
for the interaction effect variables with the import and inward FDI stock spatial lags 
are both negative as expected, but only statistically significant for the spatial lag 
weighted by inward FDI stocks. This suggests that the degree of FDI-weighted spatial 
interdependence for CO2-efficiency is greater for countries whose own CO2-efficiency 
is lower. This result is consistent with theoretically-derived predications from models 
of relative backwardness, catch-up and convergence.  
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In column 3, we add interactions of the spatial lag variables with our 
educational and institutional investment environment variables. We find that the level 
of human capital has a positive and statistically significant impact on the degree of 
import-weighted spatial interdependence. That is, our estimations suggest that higher 
foreign levels of CO2-efficiency in a country’s major import partners spillover more 
strongly into improved domestic CO2-efficieny where a larger share of the workforce 
in the importing country is educated, echoing similar results from statistical work into 
generic productivity spillovers (Crespo et al. 2004; Frantzen 2000). Yet no similar 
statistically significant conditioning effect of education is found for the FDI stock-
weighted spatial lag variable. 
We also find some evidence that the institutional environment governing 
business risk has a conditioning influence on the strength of CO2-efficiency enhancing 
international spillovers. The coefficient for the inward FDI-weighted spatial lag 
interacted with our investment profile measure is positive and statistically significant. 
The equivalent coefficient for the import-weighted spatial lag, however, fails to 
achieve statistical significance. In short, while a less risky investment environment 
would appear to increase the degree to which countries benefit from CO2-efficiency 
enhancing spillovers from the source countries of their major foreign investors, the 
same attribute does not increase the strength of international spillover via import-
weighted linkages with more CO2-efficient countries. 
Note, with interacted variables, the coefficients of the constituent terms on 
their own no longer have the same meaning as in non-interacted models, and all that 
really matters therefore are the coefficients of the interacted variables. The 
insignificant coefficients in column 3 of the spatial lag variables, which constitute one 
part of two interaction terms each, do not imply the absence of spillovers as such. 
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Rather, they would only indicate the absence of spatial dependence for observations in 
which the temporally lagged dependent variable, the educational variable and the 
investment profile variable are negative, zero or have very low values, i.e. in countries 
whose existing level of CO2-efficiency is very low and which have very little existing 
levels of education and which pose a high risk for foreign investors. Similarly, the 
negative coefficient of the educational variable does not mean that education has a 
negative effect on efficiency in general, only that it would have a negative effect for 
those observations for which the imports-weighted spatial lag variable is negative, 
zero or has very low values, i.e. in countries whose major trade partners are very CO2-
inefficient. 
 
7. Conclusions and discussion 
 
Although there is growing evidence that CO2-efficiency enhancing innovations in one 
country diffuse into other countries to contribute to the goals of climate mitigation, 
very little is known about the domestic conditions under which such international 
spillovers are most likely to take place (IPCC 2007; Peterson 2008). Our contribution 
in the present article seeks to address this gap. Focusing on two central channels of 
spillover, imports of machinery and manufactured goods and inward FDI, we examine 
how three domestic attributes – existing domestic CO2-efficiency, human capital and 
the institutional environment for investment – influence international CO2-efficiency 
spillovers. 
 Our statistical findings, based on a sample of 77 countries over the period 
1980-2005, are revealing. We show that countries with lower domestic CO2-
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efficiency not only improve their efficiency faster, but that they also experience 
stronger international spillovers from more CO2-efficient foreign countries which are 
major direct investors in the host economy. These results mirror previous work which 
has similarly found evidence for cross-national convergence in CO2-efficiency 
(Perkins & Neumayer, 2008). 
The results reported here also advance on previous work. First, our estimations 
provide evidence that human capital positively influences the degree of international 
CO2-efficiency spillovers from foreign countries, albeit only from major exporters of 
machinery and manufactured goods into the domestic economy. Second, Perkins & 
Neumayer (2009) found that levels of FDI-weighted CO2-efficiency in other 
economies had no statistically significant influence on domestic CO2-efficiency. The 
findings here suggest that this previous result may be a consequence of failing to take 
into account important domestic conditioning factors, namely, the fact that such 
spillovers are much stronger in less CO2-efficient countries and in countries with a 
less risky institutional environmental for investment.  
Although indicating that domestic attributes influence the strength of 
international spillovers in systematic and predictable ways, it is instructive that the 
conditioning impact of individual attributes varies between import and FDI channels. 
At face value, these differences are perhaps surprising, in that there are theoretical 
arguments to support the influence of all three attributes across both sets of 
transnational linkage. Yet there are a number of possible explanations for these 
discrepancies. That existing domestic CO2-efficiency matters for the degree of 
spillover from inward FDI, but not imports, might be explained by the observation 
that TNCs frequently transfer modern, efficient proprietary technologies and 
associated environmental management practices as part of their investments in host 
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economies (OECD 1997; Perkins 2007; UNCTAD 2007; Warhurst and Bridge 1997). 
Inward FDI should therefore logically be accompanied by a greater efficiency-
enhancing effect in less CO2-efficient countries where the gap between currently 
deployed technologies and technologies transferred by TNCs is likely to be larger. 
Although imports might also serve as a vehicle for the cross-border transfer of the 
latest, carbon-efficient technologies, the actual embodied CO2-efficiency in imports is 
likely to depend more on the demand profile from domestic actors, and there is no 
guarantee that actors in less efficient countries will demonstrate a preference for more 
CO2-efficient technologies (Luken and Van Rompaey 2008; Perkins 2007; Worrell et 
al. 2009). 
Anomalies in the case of domestic CO2 efficiency might also be (partly) 
explained by another discrepancy, namely, that education exerts a conditioning 
influence in the case of import-weighted connectivity, but not FDI-weighted 
connectivity. FDI is likely to be accompanied by the internal transfer of knowledge, 
skills and capabilities required to make productive use of new technology (Epstein 
and Roy 1998; Rock et al. 2009). The ability of countries to take full advantage of 
imported technologies, on the other hand, is likely to depend on the wider existence of 
an educated workforce. Indeed, it could be that less CO2-efficient countries have less 
educated adult populations, which might account for the result that such economies do 
not appear better-placed to exploit efficiency gains derived from imported machinery 
and manufactured goods.  
The difference in our results for imports and inward FDI regarding the 
conditioning influence of the institutional investment environment is most likely 
explained by our particular measure which captures the risk to foreign investors. 
Although a risky environment for foreign investors might also be one which inhibits 
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investments by domestic actors, it is less clear that the factors captured by the 
investment profile measure should have as great an impact on spillovers from imports 
as foreign investment. Unfortunately, in the absence of a comparable measure of risks 
faced by domestic firms, we cannot definitely say whether similar institutional 
attributes mediate import-weighted CO2-efficiency spillovers. 
Notwithstanding these differences, our statistical findings strongly support the 
thesis that domestic attributes matter in influencing the degree to which higher CO2-
efficiency in one country spills-over to raise CO2-efficiency in other countries to 
which it is linked. That is, international spillovers not only depend on the existence of 
economic ties with more CO2-efficient countries, but on domestic attributes 
influencing countries’ ability to “capture” these spillovers. Accordingly, in modelling 
the degree to which CO2-efficiency enhancing innovative efforts (R&D, etc.) spillover 
across national borders, we suggest that analysts should take account of cross-national 
differences in existing levels of (in)efficiency, education and the institutional 
environmental for investment (Bosetti et al. 2009; De Cian 2007; Grubb et al. 2002). 
Assuming that all countries are equally-placed to capture international CO2-efficiency 
spillovers is an over-simplification of a more complex, geographically contingent 
reality.  
Moreover, echoing work which highlights the importance of particular 
enabling conditions for transferring, acquiring and absorbing climate mitigation 
technologies (IPCC 2000, 2007; UNFCCC n.d.), our results indicate that improving 
domestic CO2-efficiency may be accelerated by policies which create fertile domestic 
conditions for appropriating international CO2-efficiency spillovers. Specifically, 
interventions which increase the share of the adult workforce who are educated and 
reduce the risks to foreign investors should enhance countries’ capacity to capture 
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efficiency-enhancing spillovers via imports and FDI, respectively. We cannot rule out 
the possibility that the very same policies will result in higher per capita emissions or, 
more generally, that gains in domestic CO2-efficiency will be sufficient to counteract 
the effects of rising scale (Peters et al. 2007). Yet, to the extent that increases in CO2-
efficiency are central to realising the goals of climate stabilisation (IPCC 2007; Ürge-
Vorsatz and Metz 2009), our study provides novel insights into the conditions under 
which countries are most likely to benefit from CO2-efficiency enhancing 
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Table 1. Summary descriptive statistical variable information. 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln ity  1.081 0.596 -0.464 3.219 
1ln ity −  1.078 0.603 -0.464 3.219 
itGDPpc  8.841 1.042 6.179 10.557 
% itindust  31.253 8.281 6.846 62.160 
itedu  7.153 3.107 0.377 12.951 












− −∑  0.754 0.217 0.119 1.371 






⋅∑  0.895 0.539 -0.358 2.828 


































⋅∑  5.610 2.784 0.000 16.083 
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Table 2. Estimation results. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
1ln ity −  0.559** 0.771** 0.681** 
 (0.0466) (0.0695) (0.0735) 
itGDPpc  0.300** 0.257** 0.186** 
 (0.0712) (0.0557) (0.0410) 
% itindust  -0.00326* -0.00445** -0.00407** 
 (0.00145) (0.00137) (0.00135) 
itedu  -0.0276 -0.0189 -0.0516* 
 (0.0326) (0.0262) (0.0229) 
itinvprof  -0.00443** -0.00301 -0.00519 






− −∑  0.331** 0.161* -0.280 






− −∑  
-0.00729 0.115** 0.0150 
 (0.0366) (0.0398) (0.112) 







 -0.0888 0.0318 
  (0.0708) (0.0696) 







 -0.0881** -0.111** 








  0.0686** 








  -0.0116 








  -0.0206 








  0.0274** 
   (0.00937) 
Observations 1271 1271 1271 




Appendix. List of countries included in study. 
 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (Rep.), 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
Romania, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
 
